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PARTIES
The Child:
T.L.P. born February 20, 1994. Her father is
deceased. Her mother is the respondent/appellee. The court
appointed the Office of the Guardian ad Litem, "the
Guardian" to represent the Child's best interests.
The Parents:
Candice M. Suitter, "the Mother." She is the
Child's mother. She is the respondent/appellee.
Kory Pasquin, "the Father," He is the Child's father.
He is deceased.
The Grandmother:
Geri Pasquin, "the Grandmother." She is the
Child's paternal grandmother. She is appealing the denial of
her petition for grandparent visitation.
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
Geri Pasquin,
Petitioner/Appellant,
vs.
Candice M. Suitter,
Respondent/Appellee.

Case No. 20010717-CA
Priority No. 4

GUARDIAN ad LITEM'S BRIEF

JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to hear this case pursuant to Utah R.
App. P. 4(a) because this is an appeal from a final order regarding visitation effectively
dismissing the Grandmother's visitation petition.

ISSUES FOR REVIEW
1. Whether the district court relied on insufficient evidence to support its findings,
which in turn supported its denial of the grandmother' petition. To raise an insufficiencyof-evidence claim, the Grandmother must marshal all evidence supporting the challenged
findings and then demonstrate how the marshaled evidence is legally insufficient to
support those findings. Campbell v. Campbell 896 P.2d 635, 638 (Utah Ct. App. 1995).

2. Whether the quality of the Guardian ad litem's representation is an issue the
Grandmother may raise on appeal when she has not first raised it to the trial court. State
v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74 ^ 11. To the extent the claim goes to sufficiency of evidence, the
20010717-CA

1

Grandmother bears the burden of marshaling the evidence. Campbell v. Campbell 896
P.2d 635, 638 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). Moreover, the claim may be one of invited error
given that it was the Grandmother's petition and she had the burden of producing
evidence to support it. Utah Code Ann. § 30-5-2(2).

STATUTES, RULES, CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
Utah Code Ann. § 30-5-2(2).

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case: The Grandmother appeals a district court order denying her
petition for visitation. R.548.

Course of the Proceedings: In December 1997, the Grandmother petitioned the
district court for visitation to her three year-old granddaughter. R. 1-3.

Disposition at Trial Court: In April 2000 and May 2001, the court convened an
evidentiary hearing and entered a written decision in July 2001 denying the petition and
leaving visitation to the discretion of the Child's Mother. R. 541-47. The Grandmother
appeals. R.548.
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Because the Appellant (the child's paternal grandmother, hereinafter referred to as
"the Grandmother") challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, the facts are presented in
the light most favorable to those found by the trier of fact. Tucker v. Tucker, 910 P.2d
1209, 1216 (Utah 1996).

The Grandmother's son, Kory Pasquin, died in a boating accident in December
1996 when the Child was two years old. R.223. After the Father's death, the Mother and
Grandmother became embroiled in litigation involving a family business. In May of
1997, less than a year after the Father's death, the Grandmother terminated contact with
the Child. R.541-47. Six months later, in December 1997, the Grandmother petitioned
for grandparent visitation. R. 1 -3.

The domestic relations commissioner recommended that a guardian ad litem be
appointed to represent the best interests of the minor Child. The Mother objected to the
appointment of any guardian ad litem. R.23; 43-45.

At a hearing on the Mother's objection, the judge was emphatic that the matter not
proceed without the assistance of a guardian ad litem: "We aren't doing anything till we
have a guardian ad litem

We need a guardian ad litem appointed. Now, what's

standing between the people in this room sitting in front of the bar there and getting a
20010717-CA
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guardian ad litem appointed?" R.555 at 23-25; R.160. The Office of the Guardian ad
Litem was notified and the Guardian soon entered her notice of appearance. R.184.
Again, the Mother's attorney objected to the appointment and urged the Guardian to
stipulate to a vacation of her appointment. R. 193; 210-13. The Guardian set up a time
for the Mother to bring the Child in for an interview. The Mother did not show, did not
call to cancel and did not call to reschedule. R.308-10.

The Guardian, in her report to the court, urged the court to order the Mother to
cooperate and to allow her access to the Child. R.308-10.

The Guardian appeared at what was to be the evidentiary hearing. R.319. The
court was not happy to learn she had been denied access to the Child: "We're not going
to have an evidentiary hearing because the reality is the guardian ad litem is going to be
on board. And I'm going to order cooperation with the guardian ad litem. . . I will now
repeat, the guardian ad litem is now assigned the responsibility of giving me advice
concerning the best interests of the child." R.555 at 38-39.

Finally, the Guardian ad litem, along with a clinical consultant, was able to meet
with the Child. By the time of the evidentiary hearing, a different guardian ad litem had
taken over the case load of the first. The new guardian prepared a report for the court
after consulting with the first guardian, the clinical consultant and after reading all the
20010717-CA
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documents the first guardian had amassed, including her interview notes. R.520-22. This
report detailed how the relationship between the Mother and the Grandmother had
deteriorated, how the business litigation fueled this deterioration and how the Child had
no memory of the Grandmother. R.520-22. The Guardian concluded that the Mother
appeared competent to make best interests decision regarding the Child, including who
the Child should meet with or visit. The Guardian recommended against court-ordered
visitation so long as the parties' animosity was heightened. R.522.

The matter was heard in May 2001. R.524. The court heard live testimony,
deposition testimony and received exhibits including the Guardian's report. R.524-25.
The Guardian was unable to attend the hearing because she was in another courtroom at
the time. However, she left word that she could be reached if necessary and agreed that
the matter could proceed so long as her report was submitted. R.555 at 55.

In its memorandum decision, the court denied the petition finding that visitation
was not in the child's best interests. R.541-47. "In this case, the record contains facts
sufficient for me to conclude that the best interests of [the Child] are best served by
deferring to decisions made by her mother concerning visitation with the petitioner."
Some of the reasons for denying visitation included the following: the Mother was
capable of making best interests decisions; the relationship between the two women had
deteriorated; there was no immediate prospect of things getting better; the Grandmother
20010717-CA
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wanted to introduce the Child to her two half-siblings against the wishes of the Mother;
the Grandmother was responsible for the break down of her relationship with the Child;
and the Child had no memory of the Grandmother.

In discussing the relationship between the two women, the court noted,
I agree with the guardian's conclusions, as I simply do
not believe that [the Child] will be the beneficiary of courtordered visitation in the current climate of conflict and
acrimony. I hasten to note that the conflict at issue here is not
of the type addressed by the Court of Appeals in Campbell.1
There, the court rejected the claims of stress and trauma
associated with the grandparent visitation litigation as a basis
for denying visitation, observing that the stress of the
litigation would likely end when the litigation terminated.
Here, the litigation creating the conflict between petitioner
and Ms. Suitter is separate from and predated this action and
may well survive it.
Accordingly, based on Ms. Suitter's legitimate
interests in defining [the Child's] relationship with her stepsiblings, Ms. Suitter's reasonable decision not to reintegrate
the petitioner into her life or the life of [the Child] so long as
animosity lingered over the business-related litigation, and
petitioner's token efforts to maintain ties with [the Child], I
conclude that [the Child's] best interests will not be served by
granting grandparent visitation.
The Grandmother appeals the denial of the visitation petition. R.548.

Campbell v.Campbell 896 P.2d 635 (Utah Ct. App. 1995).
20010717-CA
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Grandmother seeks to retry the case by rearguing the evidence in her favor.
She fails to marshal the evidence, state a standard of review, demonstrate whether the
claim was preserved and state an appropriate appellate claim. The Grandmother faults
the court for relying on insufficient evidence in denying the petition when it was she who
had the burden of producing evidence. Finally, the Grandmother's claim regarding the
role of the Guardian ad litem is without merit because (1) it is not an appellate claim; (2)
it misstates the record and the law; and (3) it goes to sufficiency of the evidence. This
Court should therefore affirm the denial of the visitation petition.

ARGUMENT
1. THE GRANDMOTHER RAISES NO APPELLATE CLAIM.
The Grandmother claims the trial court relied on insufficient evidence to support
its denial of the visitation petition. Without citing to the record, or to any case law, she
reargues the facts in the light most favorable to her to establish her point. Grandmother's
Brief at 11-14. In a related claim, the Grandmother claims the evidence was insufficient
to support the court's finding that she made only token efforts to stay in contact with the
Child. Grandmother's Brief at 14-15.

20010717-CA
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Utah law allows that a district court "may grant grandparents reasonable rights of
visitation, if it is in the best interest of the grandchildren, in cases where a grandparent's
child has died or has become a noncustodial parent through divorce or legal separation."
Utah Code Ann. § 30-5-2(2). The subsection of the statute applies because the
Grandmother's child has died and she was seeking visitation from the child's mother.

The Grandmother does not challenge the application of the statute. She challenges
the sufficiency of the evidence. To raise an insufficiency claim, the Grandmother must
marshal all evidence supporting the challenged findings and then demonstrate how the
marshaled evidence is legally insufficient to support the challenged findings. Campbell v
Campbell 896 P.2d 635, 638 (Utah Ct. App. 1995).

Here, the Grandmother challenges the visitation order. Thus she challenges
virtually all the findings including:

• The Mother should be the one to tell the Child about her father's history.

• The Mother had a "strained" relationship with the Father's other children.

• The Grandmother was likely to inform the Child of the existence of her half
siblings and to encourage a relationship with them against the Mother's wishes.
20010717-CA
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• The relationship between the Mother and the Grandmother deteriorated after the
death of the Father due to litigation involving the Mother's claims to an interest in a
business owned by the Father's family.

• The Grandmother "made little effort to reach out to [the Child] or [the Mother].
She made no meaningful attempts to send gifts to [the Child] or otherwise make contact
with her."

• The Child had no memory of the Grandmother.
R.541-47.

In adding up these findings, the court determined that the Child would not benefit
from being required to visit the Grandmother "in the current climate of conflict and
acrimony" which went beyond the visitation litigation and included the business
litigation.

Here, the Grandmother has not marshaled the evidence. Instead, she reargues the
facts (without citing to the record) in the light most favorable to her position and asks this
Court for a second opinion. That is not an appellate claim.

20010717-CA
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First, the Grandmother had the burden to produce, given that it was her petition.
So any insufficiency argument becomes one of invited error. Moreover, the district court
had evidence to support its denial of the petition. It heard live testimony and deposition
testimony, it had the guardian's report and other exhibits. It also had the benefit of
proffered evidence from prior hearings. The Grandmother has not marshaled any of this.
This Court should decline to consider her claim and should defer to the district court in
making this fact-intensive determination.

2. THE GRANDMOTHER'S CLAIMS REGARDING
THE GUARDIAN AD LITEM ARE NOT TRUE
AND ARE NOT APPROPRIATE APPELLATE CLAIMS.
The Grandmother claims the Guardian ad Litem did not provide appropriate
representation. She does not frame this claim as an appellate claim, nor does she mention
a standard of appellate review.

First, problems with one's representation of a client are raised before the Utah
State Bar, before the Director of the Office of the Guardian ad Litem, or they are raised
as ineffectiveness of counsel claims. Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-911. Second, the claim
was not raised to the trial court and thus was not preserved for appeal. State v. Holgate,
2000 UT 74 K 11-14; Hart v. Salt Lake Co. Comm'n, 945 P.2d 125, 130 (Utah App.
1997).
20010717-CA
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If one were to read an appellate claim into this issue, perhaps a case could be made
for the Grandmother making a sufficiency-of-the-evidence claim.2 That is, the
Grandmother is claiming that the court relied on insufficient evidence to make the best
interest finding because the Guardian ad litem should have provided more evidence. If
this is her claim, the Grandmother needs to marshal all the evidence supporting the
challenged best interest finding and then demonstrate how the marshaled evidence is
legally insufficient to support the finding. Campbell v. Campbell 896 P.2d 635, 638
(UtahCt.App. 1995).

Here, the Grandmother has not met the marshaling burden. The previous section
marshals a portion of the evidence, which, in itself, is sufficient to support the district
court's best interest finding. Accordingly, this Court should deem the evidence legally
sufficient and should affirm the visitation order.

A second reason to decline to consider the claim is the fact that the Grandmother
has not preserved the issue of insufficiency of evidence. "As a general rule, to ensure
that the trial court addresses the sufficiency of the evidence, a defendant must request that
the court do so." Where the claim is sufficiency of the evidence, the appellant must first

2

This is an interesting claim given that the Grandmother had the burden of
producing evidence to support her petition. If she is now claiming insufficient evidence,
she is essentially conceding her point, or perhaps she is inviting error or both.
20010717-CA
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preserve it for review. Holgate, 2000 UT 74 f 143. Here, the Grandmother did not
preserve the claim that the court relied on insufficient evidence to support its best
interests findings, nor did the Grandmother preserve the claim that the Guardian relied on
insufficient information in preparing her report. Accordingly, the Grandmother has
waived any claim going to insufficient evidence. Hart, 945 P.2d at 130.

The following is offered in the event this Court chooses to consider the role of the
Guardian ad litem in district court civil cases.

Recent case law has put in question the exact duties and responsibilities of the
guardian ad litem in civil matters in district court cases. State v. Harrison 2001 UT 33.
While Harrison dealt with the guardian's role in criminal cases, the guardian's role in
civil cases remains governed by case law and by statute, which establish that where there
are allegations of abuse and neglect, the guardian's duties and responsibilities shall be
that of counsel for a party. In re J.W.F. v. Schoolcraft, 763 P.2d 1217, 1220-1221 (Utah
Ct. App. 1988), rev'd on other grounds, 799 P.2d 710 (1990). In the present case, the
district court appointed an attorney guardian ad litem to determine whether court-

3

While the Holgate decision relies on Utah R. Crim. P. 17(o) regarding mandatory
arrest of judgment for insufficiency of the evidence, the civil analogy would be Utah
Code Ann. § 77-17-3 and Utah R. Civ. P. 59(a) regarding discretionary remedies for
claims of insufficient evidence.
20010717-CA
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enforced visitation would be in the child's best interests or whether such visitation would
be potentially abusive or negligent.

In this case, the district court was emphatic that the case not proceed without the
participation of a guardian ad litem. As early as January of 2000, the judge said "We
aren't doing anything till we have a guardian ad litem." R.555 at 23-24. When in April
2000, the judge learned that the Mother was not allowing the Guardian access to the
Child, he continued the evidentiary hearing: "We're not going to have an evidentiary
hearing (today) because the reality is the guardian ad litem is going to be on board. And
I'm going to order cooperation with the guardian ad litem . . . the guardian ad litem . . . is
now assigned the responsibility of giving me advice concerning the best interests of the
child." R.555 at 38-39.

The Guardian complied with her duties to the Child and to the court. That is, she
researched available data bases for child abuse allegations against the petitioner. She
interviewed the petitioner and the Child. She elicited the help of a clinical consultant.
She familiarized herself with the case and with case law and she appeared at most of the
hearings. R.520-22. While she did not appear at the evidentiary hearing, she had already
submitted her report and she let the parties and the court know how she could be reached.
R.555 at 55-56. If the Grandmother truly believed that the Guardian had not done her

20010717-CA
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duty she could have raised the matter to the trial court, with the Guardian herself, with
the director of the Office of the Guardian ad Litem or with the Utah State Bar.

It was the Grandmother who produced insufficient evidence to support her
petition. When her petition failed, she chose to blame the Guardian for not siding with
her. For these reasons, this Court should decline to consider her claim and should affirm
the visitation order.

ORAL ARGUMENT: PUBLICATION OF OPINION
The Guardian ad Litem does not request oral argument or a published opinion
because the Grandmother raises only factual issues and states no appellate claims.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the Guardian moves this court to affirm the district
court's visitation order.

DATED this 7th day of January 2002.

MARTHA PIERCE
Guardian ad Litem

20010717-CA
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the 7 day of January 2002,1 caused to be mailed, postage
prepaid, two true and exact copies of the Guardian ad Litem's Brief to:
Brian W. Steffensen
William J. Middleton
2159 South 700 East, Suite 100
Salt Lake City, UT 84106
Robert Copier
243 East 400 South, Suite 200
Salt Lake City, UT 84111-2803

;

^~

-

MARTHA PIERCE
Guardian ad Litem
ADDENDA
1. Memorandum Decision entered July 9, 2001. R.541-47.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

6ERI PASQUIN

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Petitioner,

CASE NO. 970910481

vs<
KORY PASQUIN, deceased, and
CANDICE M. SOUTER,
Respondents.

Petitioner is the grandmother of Tori Lynn Pasquin, who was
born in February, 1994, to the petitioner's son, Kory Pasquin, and
Candice M. Souter. Kory Pasquin died in October, 2000. Petitioner
brought this action to gain visitation rights with Tori Lynn
pursuant to Section 30-5-2, Utah Code Ann. (1998).
A hearing was held in this action on May 31, 2001.

Having

considered the evidence received at that hearing, together with the
relevant law, I render the following Memorandum Decision which
incorporates my findings of fact and conclusions of law.
Utah's

grandparent

visitation

statute

creates

two

classifications of grandparents. The first comprises grandparents
whose child has died or has become a non-custodial parent through

PASQUIN V. SOUTER

PAGE 2

divorce or legal separation.

MEMORANDUM DECISION

The second includes -all other-

grandparents'- Where, as here, the grandparent's- child is deceased,
the grandparent may exercise reasonable rights of visitation based
on a showing that visitation is in the best interests of the
grandchild. Grandparents who fall in the second statutory category
must overcome more rigorous requirements to obtain .court ordered
visitation. In addition to demonstrating that visitation is In the
best interests of the grandchild, the grandparent must, among other
things* overcome by clear and convincing evidence a presumption
that the parents''decision concerning visitation is reasonable.
Although explicit deference to a-parent's -decision appears
only in Section 30-5-2 (2>, governing grandparent visitation outside
the

context

of

death,

divorce

or

legal

separation,

it

is

impossible, in my view, to disregard parental decision making«as an
element of a best interest analysis applied under Section 30-52(1).

Put another way, it is difficult to image a situation in

which

a parent's

reasonable

decision

to

deny

a

grandparent

visitation with a child would be contrary to the child's best
interests.

That is that case here.

The importance of the parent-child relationship has been
recognized by the Utah Court of Appeals in interpreting the

PASQUIN V. SOUTER
predecessor

to

PAGE 3
the

current

MEMORANDUM DECISION

grandparent

visitation

Campbell v. Campbell, 986 P.2d 635 (Utah App. 1995).

statute.

In this case,

the record contains facts sufficient for me to conclude that the
best interests of Tori Lynn are best served by deferring to
decisions made by her mother concerning

visitation with the

petitioner.
Petitioner urges me to recognize that it is in Tori Lynn's
best interest to learn about her father's life and to preserve his
memory.

Petitioner

contends

that

accomplish this and eager to start.

she

is

best-equipped

to

I agree, however, with

respondent that Tori Lynn's father's history is best left to be
communicated by her mother.

Kori Pasquin fathered two other

children with other women. The relationship between Ms. Souter and
Kory Pasquin's other children, particularly Karly, is strained. On
the other hand, the testimony strongly suggests that the petitioner
would encourage the development of a relationship between Tori Lynn
and her step-siblings. In my view, the questions of whether, when
and how to inform Tori Lynn that she has step-siblings and of what,
if any, relationship Tori Lynn should have with them is best left
to Ms. Souter.
It is also significant that following the death of Kory

PASQUIN V. SOUTER
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MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pasquin, the relationship between the Souters and the petitioner
deteriorated in the face of litigation involving claims made by Ms.
Souter to an interest in a business owned by the Pasquins.
litigation

has

not

prevented

Ms. Souter

That

from maintaining

a

relationship with the petitioner's divorced husband who regularly
visits Tori Lynn with Ms. Souter's consent.
It is undisputed that petitioner had developed a friendship
with Ms. Souter before the birth of Tori Lynn which continued
through Mother's Day 1997.

Ms. Souter would frequently visit

petitioner at petitioner's place of work with Tori Lynn.
After Mother's Day 1997, Ms. Souter ended the relationship.
Irrespective of who might be at fault for ending the friendship,
petitioner made little effort to reach out to Tori Lynn or Ms.
Souter. She made no meaningful attempts to send gifts to Tori Lynn
or otherwise make contact with her.
Penny H. Breiman was appointed as guardian ad litem to
represent the interests of Tori Lynn. Her successor, Robin Ravert,
prepared

a report and

evidence at the hearing.

recommendations which was received in
According to the report, Ms. Breiman,

together with Katina Temme, the clinical consultant to the guardian
ad litem, interviewed Tori Lynn in June, 2000. At that time, Tori

PASQUIN V. SOUTER
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MEMORANDUM DECISION

Lynn had no memory of the petitioner, but it appeared that she had
overheard disparaging remarks about her.

The guardian ad litem

recommended that visitation not be ordered with the petitioner
based in part on the conflict between the parties which could be
traced to the prior litigation involving the petitioner and Ms.
Souter.

I agree with the guardian's conclusions, as I simply do

not believe that Tori Lynn will be the beneficiary of court-ordered
visitation in the current climate of conflict and acrimony.

I

hasten to note that the conflict at issue here is not of the type
addressed by the Court of Appeals in Campbell.

There, the court

rejected the claims of stress and trauma associated with the
grandparent

visitation

litigation

as

a

basis

for

denying

visitation, observing that the stress of the litigation would
likely end when the litigation terminated.

Here, the litigation

creating the conflict between petitioner and Ms. Souter is separate
from and predated this action and may well survive it.
Accordingly, based on Ms. Souter's legitimate interests in
defining Tori Lynn's relationship with her step-siblings, Ms.
Souter's reasonable decision not to reintegrate the petitioner into
her life or the life of Tori Lynn so long as animosity lingered
over

the business-related

litigation,

and petitioner's

token

PASQUIN V. SOUTER
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MEMORANDUM DECISION

efforts to maintain ties with Tori Lynn, I conclude that Tori
Lynn's best interests will not be served by granting grandparent
visitation.
Dated this

*? day of July, 2001.

'^JU^^d
RONALD E. NEHRI
DISTRICT COURT

